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Legal Implications of Cryonics
Daniel R. Spector*
C RYOGENICS IS THE SCIENCE that deals with the production of very low
temperatures and their effect on the properties of matter. The
visual aspects of experiments in this field are fascinating. The practical
aspects seem, at first glance, to be of considerably less consequence.
However, this feeling of indifference does not arise as we ponder the
ramifications of freezing one class of inanimate objects: dead human
bodies. This is the realm of a more specific and indeed very new branch
of cryogenics, namely, cryonics.
The term cryonics was first used less than 3 years ago by an indus-
trial designer and one-time Vice President of the Cryonics Society of
New York, named Karl Werner. Cryogenics is the broad term. Cryo-
biology deals with the effects of low temperatures on living material gen-
erally. Finally, cryonics focuses on human living material and how hu-
man bodies can be frozen and thus preserved until a cure for the cause
of death can be found.1
Mr. Robert C. W. Ettinger, President of the Cryonics Society of
Michigan, has developed a thesis which serves as the foundation of cry-
onics. This thesis is the product of connecting an "established fact" to
a "reasonable assumption."
The fact: At very low temperatures it is possible, right now, to pre-
serve dead people with essentially no deterioration, indefinitely.
The assumption: If civilization endures, medical science should
eventually be able to repair almost any damage to the human body,
including freezing damage and senile debility or other cause of
death.2
While Mr. Ettinger uses the phrase "with essentially no deterioration,"
cryobiologists have yet to succeed in freezing and thawing a major hu-
man organ without destroying it.3 He does concede, however, that pres-
ent freezing techniques are "far from perfect." 4 And cryonists generally
recognize that "so long as we're freezing people on a part-time, occa-
*Third-year student at Syracuse University College of Law.
1 Greene, The Cry of Cryonics: Freeze, Wait, Reanimate, The National Observer
(Apr. 29, 1968) at 18, col. 1.
2 R. Ettinger, The Prospect of Immortality 1 (1964). [Hereinafter cited as Ettinger.]
Mr. Ettinger is a professor of physics and has taught at the Highland Park Junior
College which is in a suburb of Detroit, Mich. He is the internationally recognized
leader of the cryonics movement.
3 Greene, supra note 1, col. 4-5.
4 Ettinger, How the Nonfuneral was Arranged, 62 Life, Feb. 3, 1967, at 21. [Herein-
after cited as Life.] This article was written in connection with the freezing of Dr.
James Bedford on Jan. 12, 1967. Dr. Bedford was a retired psychology professor from
Glendale, Calif. who had died of lung cancer. He contacted Mr. Ettinger and, after
some initial hesitation, decided to be the first man to be frozen.
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sional basis, the treatment will be administered under primitive con-
ditions." 5 On the other hand, they proclaim (obviously) that the people
who are dying now cannot afford to wait until freezing procedures are
perfected.' It seems that as long as we're depending upon future science
to cure the original cause of death we might also ask it to rectify the
freezing damage we have caused. However, the two do not necessarily
go hand in hand. It is clearly the task of today's science to improve
crude methods of freezing so as to minimize freezing damage. If a person
died of pneumonia in the year 1900 and was then crudely frozen his
chances of revival today would be very slim. The chances for curing the
pneumonia are excellent, but we could do little for the freezing damage.
Moreover, our ability to thaw him is very much in doubt.7
Three things are essential to the task of preserving the body: pro-
tective agents injected into the body, a proper storage medium, and a
safe container to hold the body. Protective agents are needed to prevent,
or at least limit, freezing damage. The two most popular are glycerol
and dimethylsulfoxide (DMSO). Both act as a kind of antifreeze. They
bind molecules of water to them so as to lessen the amount of water
available for the formation of ice crystals.9 With regard to a proper
storage medium there has been some discussion as to the relative merits
of liquid nitrogen and liquid helium. At the present time liquid nitrogen
(nitrogen is a liquid at -197 ° Centigrade) is preferable to liquid helium
(helium is a liquid at -270 ° Centigrade). The latter is more expensive
and more difficult to handle. In addition, more damage may result from
subjecting the body to the lower temperature. 10 However, after more
is learned about freezing, helium will probably be used as temperatures
near absolute zero (-273 Centigrade) are more effective in slowing
down life processes-and this is the basis of cryogenic preservation."
With regard to a container for the body, several "cryocapsules" have
5 3 Cryonics Reports (Dec. 1968) at 246.
6 Life, supra note 4. Some types of freezing damage which are possible are: me-
chanical damage by intercellular or intracellular ice crystallization (the latter is
caused by fast freezing, the former by slow freezing); high concentration of salts
within the cells as a result of dehydration; metabolic imbalance, etc. Ettinger, supra
note 2 at 16-18.
7 Thawing must be fast. Not all biochemical reactions resume at the same time.
With slow thawing the various life processes will be thrown out of kilter, and as ice
crystals grow, nearby cells can be mechanically damaged. Frisch, Will We Freeze
Ourselves into the Future? 61 Science Digest (June 1967) at 20-21.
8 Ettinger, supra note 2, at 22.
9 In the Bedford freezing [discussed in note 4 supra] DMSO was used. Life, supra
note 4. In a more recent freezing, that of Steven J. Mandell, a college student at
New York University, glycerol was used. 3 Cryonics Reports (Sept. 1968) at 165.
10 Ettinger, supra note 2, at 39-40.
11 Id. at 10. Even dry ice which is inexpensive and easy to handle is suggested "as
an emergency or austerity measure." Id. at 40. The temperature of dry ice is -79°
Centigrade.
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LEGAL CRYONICS
been built. The first usable capsule, designed and constructed by the
Cryo-Care Equipment Corporation of Phoenix, Arizona, sold for $4100.12
Having touched briefly upon the mechanics involved, let us look at
the principles which underlie Mr. Ettinger's thesis. He has written:
It used to be thought that the distinction between life and death was
simple and obvious. A living man breathes, sweats and makes stupid
remarks; a dead man just lies there, pays no attention, and after a
while gets putrid. But nowadays nothing is that simple.1
3
People in the medical profession have agreed:
It is plain that advances in the various fields of biology are blurring
boundaries that used to distinguish clearly between the living and
the dead.
14
Exactly how the life/death line has attenuated can be seen by noting the
various degrees of death that science recognizes. Traditionally, the mo-
ment when death occurred was marked by the cessation of spontaneous
heartbeat and respiration. These criteria are known as the signs of "clin-
ical death." "5 "Biological death" can be described as the state of damage
from which the whole person cannot be revived, even by the use of the
most modem medical techniques. 16 "Cellular death" refers to an irre-
versible degeneration of the individual cells of the body. 17 Still another
form of death is "brain death," that is, the cessation of brain activity as
indicated by a flat electroencephalogram. Is To add to this confusion is
the following statement concerning "legal death":
Though the legal definition of death is important for determining
legal rights, law defines death not by some dictionary definition but
by scientific criteria used by physicians and accepted by the public.
The definition of death is properly a medical rather than a legal
12 Frisch, The Cryonic Underground, 61 Science Digest (June 1967) at 23. The most
recent developments in capsule construction have come from Fusion Techniques, a
welding contracting company in East Northport, N. Y. They are attempting to solve
the problems that plagued the early manufacture of cryocapsules: high initial cost,
large overall dimensions, excessive weight, high maintenance costs, and even an un-
aesthetic appearance "causing it to have limited market appeal." 3 Cryonics Reports
(Nov. 1968) at 218-19.
13 Quoted in Playboy Interview: Stanley Kubrick, 15 Playboy (Sept. 1968), at 182.
Mr. Kubrick is a well-known producer and director of motion pictures.
14 Gorny, The New Biology and the Future of Man, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 273, 312
(1968). Roderic Gorny is an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry in Residence at the
U.C.L.A. School of Medicine.
15 Id. at 311. The word "spontaneous" is important as there exist means of main-
taining heartbeat and respiration artificially. The latter is done with "iron lungs"
and pressure chambers. The former with electronic "pacemakers" and pumps. There
is also a machine that performs the jobs of both heart and lungs, aerating the blood
as well as pumping it. Ettinger, supra note 2, at 45.
16 Id. at 312.
17 Id.
18 Hamburger, Discussion, in Ethics in Medical Progress 69 (G. Wolstenholme ed.
1966).
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problem. If death is to be redefined, physicians must first agree on
the applicable criteria. 19
With these concepts of death in mind Mr. Ettinger tells us that man
dies little by little usually, in imperceptible gradations, and the
question of reversibility at any stage depends on the state of medical
art.
20
Today clinical death is often reversible. Numerous patients "die" clin-
ically on the operating table only to be revived by artificial stimulation
of the heart (heart massage, drugs, electric shock) and by artificial res-
piration. 21 The phrase "modern medical techniques" in the definition of
biological death2 2 suggests that the criteria of biological death can, and
will change often.2 3 Thus this type of death will become reversible upon
the discovery of new medical techniques. Even cellular death may not
be final, as a cell may be made nonfunctional by relatively minor, and
eventually reparable damage.24 As far as the reversibility of brain death
is concerned, there have been cases where a flat electroencephalogram
was recorded for several hours and the patient fully recovered. 25 Thus if
a person is declared dead by any one of the standards herein described
he may be only "slightly dead," i.e., just out of reach of resuscitation by
today's methods.
It is not difficult to understand Mr. Ettinger when he says that the
idea of cryonic suspension (freezing) will be repugnant to many people,
and that it unsettles them and makes them nervous. 26 Nevertheless, he
steadfastly maintains that:
It is easy to perceive that a large-scale freezer program must
inexorably develop, sooner or later, whether or not my degree of
optimism becomes general, and whether or not my personal efforts
exert much influence. 27
Accepting the feasibility of Mr. Ettinger's thesis, and assuming that
the complex biological problems such as preventing ice crystallization
19 Sanders and Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and
Kidney Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 357, 409 (1968). David Sanders is an
Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the U.C.L.A. School of Medicine. Jesse
Dukeminier, Jr. is a Professor of Law at the U.C.L.A. Law School.
20 Ettinger, supra note 2, at 3.
21 Id. at 44.
22 See note 15 supra.
23 Ettinger, supra note 2, at 3. As soon as a method for reviving a particular body is
discovered, that body is no longer "biologically dead." Id.
24 Id.
25 Hamburger, supra note 17. At the World Medical Assembly in Sydney, Australia
on Aug. 9, 1968 Dr. G. Dekker of the Netherlands said he knew of a case where a
complete recovery followed a four day absence of brain activity. 3 Cryonics Reports(Sept. 1968) at 174.
26 Id. at 172.
27 Id. at 170.
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in the "freezee's" blood stream are solved,2 8 the next step is to provide
for the frozen population in our jurisprudential framework. And in do-
ing so it must be understood that the core of the problem of re-evaluating
our laws arises from the basic concept of cryonics, that being the freezing
of the legally dead29 in the hope of eventual rescue. Thus, despite state-
ments made by advocates of cryonic suspension to the effect that
[D]eath is no more natural or inevitable than smallpox or diph-
theria. Death is a disease and as susceptible to cure as any other
disease. Over the eons, man's powerlessness to prevent death has
led him to force it from the forefront of his mind, for his own psy-
chological health, and to accept it unquestioningly as the unavoid-
able termination. But with the advance of science, this is no longer
necessary-or desirable.
30
we must remember that if cryobiological research does result in a cure
for death, it will be a post-mortem cure. Death, as we know it, will have
already occurred. It was not prevented from happening by freezing.
With this in mind we can consider some of the ways whereby we can
merge an astonishing theory with our mundane legal system.
We can say that:
(1) All of our laws which incorporate the word "death" should be
construed as including a dead person who has been frozen as he was
required to be legally dead before he could be frozen in the first place.
In other words death is final.
.(2) An exception should be made in the interpretation of the word
"death" in our laws so as to put the frozen dead in a separate category;
thus we would be allowing for the contingency of future revival.
(3) Discard the connotation of death as an absolute in every in-
stance; i.e., redefine it altogether.
The first suggestion ignores the realities of the situation. It is true
that most scientists are inclined to set their sights on the far distant
future when they speak of future revival. They feel that either it will
take a very long time for science to be able to reverse the damaging
effects of today's crude freezing techniques or, more importantly, that
it will take a very long time for science to develop freezing techniques
that are safe.8 1 They are, at best, "tolerant" of the cryonists. But while
28 See notes 6 and 7 supra.
29 See note 19 supra.
30 Quoted in Playboy Interview: Stanley Kubrick, supra note 12, at 184.
31 Dr. Stanley W. Jacob, an Associate Professor of Surgery at the University of
Oregon School of Medicine says:
I'm afraid the poor man's funds [referring to Dr. James Bedford, supra note 5]
have been wasted, as far as his own chances are concerned.
Quoted in Cryoburial Raises Scientific Heat, 8 Medical World News, (Feb. 24, 1967)
at 34.
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they publicly insist that there is little hope that today's freezees can be
revived, cryonists reply that this pessimism is not supported by actual
calculations of probability but only by "uneducated guesses at best." 32
And what is there to prevent medical science from discovering a cure
for, let's say, terminal cancer in the year 1975 as opposed to 500 hence?
There is little doubt such a cure is possible. And if we speak in terms
of revival in three to five years as compared with five centuries, we may
be able to conclude that the freezee was not "away" so long as to compel
him to return to society with a totally different identity than he had
when he "died." Conversely, if he were to be brought back to an ad-
vanced civilization hundreds of years from now, he could be said for all
intents and purposes to be "someone else." Drawing the line beyond
which a freezee could be said to have lost his former identity and his
place in the mainstream of the society he knew when he "died," and
beyond which the continuity of his affairs has been irrevocably inter-
rupted would indeed be difficult. But the manifest necessity of drawing
such a line compels us to reassess death and not to think of it as final
and irreversible. If a man may be allowed to continue where he left off,
it would be grossly unfair to penalize him for the time he spent in his
liquid nitrogen bath.
In considering the reassessment of the concept of death in the light
of the time when a person is returned to society let us look at the follow-
ing situations:
Case #1-a man has died but had executed a valid will. This will
is fairly complex, and as a result it will take approximately five years
to probate it. The testator was frozen cryogenically in the hope that he
would be revived at some indeterminate future time and that the dis-
ease he died from, one that science has long been on the brink of curing,
would be cured. The testator is, in fact, revived within three years. He
is fully competent and can be said to be fit to re-enter society at the
same point he left it. Should he be deprived of resuming control of his
estate?
Case #2-a man has a valid cause of action against another. The
applicable statute of limitations is three years. If the man dies before
the three years have elapsed his representative has, by New York's stat-
ute, one year after the man's death in which to commence the action.3
Applying this provision where the total elapsed time including the one
year grace period is less than the originally allotted three years is mani-
festly unfair. Should a man who died only a few weeks after the cause
32 Henderson and Ettinger, Cryonic Suspension and the Law, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
414, 417-18 (1968). Curtis Henderson is the President of the Cryonics Society of New
York and a Member of the New York Bar.
33 N.Y. CPLR § 210 (a) (McKinney 1963).
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of action accrued and who is frozen cryogenically be deprived of the
three year limitation period if he is revived more than one year after
death but before the three year statute has run? Even if he is not re-
vived at all, should his representative be denied a request to extend the
grace period to three years? The essential element in this case as in case
#1, supra, is the non-recognition of death as final when the decedent is
placed in cryonic suspension. We are not saying that a dead man must
be afforded the full running of any statute of limitations. We are only
suggesting that if a man is revived and is able, as a matter of law, to re-
sume his former place in society, and the statute of limitations has not
run, then perhaps he should be said not to have died at all. Applying
this reasoning to case #1, supra, we can conclude that we should not
deprive a man of regaining control of his estate if he is revived and can
resume his former place in society.
Case #3-in a variation of case #2, supra, let us make the plaintiff
an infant. If he is seventeen years old when the cause of action accrues
he has, by statute, until he is twenty-four years old (three years after
the "disability" of infancy ceases) to bring the action.34 Alternatively,
if he dies his representative (e.g., parent) has, by statute, up to three
years after -his death in which to bring the action.3 5 If he dies when he
is nineteen years old the action must be brought on his behalf within
three years, and not within five years.36 However, if the infant plaintiff
is frozen cryogenically, what is the point beyond which the plaintiff him-
self (if he is revived) or his representative (if he is not revived) can no
longer bring the action? Suppose the plaintiff is revived just before his
twenty-second birthday. The issue of time limitations for a representa-
tive suit does not exist because (1) the statute compels a representative
suit to be commenced within three years of the date of plaintiff's death
37
and three years have not yet elapsed, and (2) once revived, the plaintiff
was never really dead so he needs no representative. It would seem that
here the plaintiff should be allowed until his twenty-fourth birthday
(three years after his "disability" ends) to bring the action.38 But, not-
withstanding the statute of limitations, if the plaintiff could be considered
to be "away too long" and thus unable to resume his former place in
society, he should be barred from bringing the action. Now consider the
problem encountered if the plaintiff is revived on his twenty-third birth-
34 Ibid. § 208.
35 Id. § 208.
36 Id. § 208 provides that:
[T]he time within which the action must be commenced shall be extended to
three years after the disability ceases or the person under the disability dies, which-
ever event first occurs ...
37 N.Y. CPLR § 208 (McKinney 1963).
38 Ibid. § 208.
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1969
18 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
day. The issue of time limitations for a representative suit is again moot
as there cannot be any period designated as "three years after date of
death" if the plaintiff (once revived) was never really dead. And even
though we might want to give the plaintiff until his twenty-fourth birth-
day to bring the suit, we must remember that he was away for four years
and this may be too long.
Once we are sure that a person can't be revived within a reasonable
period of time, for the purposes of a particular cause of action we must
consider him dead. Before we consider what such a reasonable time is,
let us examine some of the equities that must be injected into our cases
on behalf of all the parties concerned.
In giving the freezee the benefit of not being ignored we must not
go so far as to damage his adversaries. If the freezee himself is to be the
eventual plaintiff in an action we will allow him to sue if he is able to
resume his former place in society. If he will not be able to be revived
within such time and a representative suit is desired, certain benefits
must be accorded the representative. The best thing we could do would
be to give the representative due notice as to the possibility of reviving
the freezee so as to allow him to avoid being barred by the one year lim-
itation in Section 210 (a) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules39
or by the three year limitation in Section 208 of that statute.40 But as
such a prediction may very well be impossible to make accurately we
would do better to extend the time in which to bring the representative
suit to that point in time when the decedent himself would have been
allowed to bring the action had he been successfully revived. In both
the freezee suit and the representative suit the upper limits would be the
statute of limitations.
As far as protecting the freezee's adversary in a suit we are not
allowing either the freezee or his representative to bring an action after
a point in time where the freezee (if revived) would be unable to resume
his former identity. As an additional measure of protection in a situation
involving Section 210 (a) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules41
consider the following: a man dies and is frozen cryogenically only weeks
before the applicable statute of limitations runs, and up to that point no
action has been commenced. If the representative requests an additional
year to bring the action he must be refused. He cannot be allowed to
burn the candle at both ends. If his testate (or intestate) were frozen
immediately after the cause of action accrued he undoubtedly would
have waived the one year grace period in exchange for an opportunity
to possibly get the full time afforded by the statute of limitations. There-
39 Id. §210(a).
40 Id. § 208.
41 Id. § 210(a).
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fore, the logical conclusion would be to include in the election to submit
to cryogenic freezing an automatic waiver of the one year grace period
by the freezee himself, such waiver to be binding on his representative.
We must continue to emphasize the fact that we are in no way
attempting to advocate a policy whereby a dead man (or his representa-
tive) is to be allowed, in every case, a full statute of limitations in which
to bring an action. What we are saying is that if a man is returned to
society before the statute of limitations has run and before we would be
compelled to consider him a reborn individual totally dissociated from
his previous identity, he should be allowed up to the full statute of lim-
itations in which to bring the action. Thus the time when the decedent
is revived is the primary element, and the statute of limitations is merely
ancillary to it. If a man is returned to society and deemed capable of re-
suming his former niche therein and the applicable statute of limitations
hasn't run, he can still bring the action. If the statute has run, he would
be barred from suing. And if the statute hasn't run but the man cannot
resume his former identity, here too he would be barred. If both the
statute has run and the man has been "away too long," of course no
action could be maintained. These same rules will apply to representa-
tive suits where the freezee cannot be revived. In these cases we look
to the time that the decedent would have still been able to bring the
action himself had he been successfully revived, always keeping in mind
the applicable statute of limitations as an upper limit.
Just as we were concerned with the relative equities of the adver-
saries in law suits involving statutes of limitations, we must also mani-
fest this concern in probate proceedings. It is clear that we cannot freeze
indefinitely the legal maneuvers of the executor or administrator of a
person's estate at the same time the person himself is frozen cryogeni-
cally. If a testator has not been successfully revived within ten years,
and his will could have been completely probated in five years, it is
illogical to have waited the ten years if after that time the testator would
not have been able to resume his former place in society anyhow. If he
would have been able to resume his former place in society we would
have allowed him to prevent the probate of his estate. Here the wait
was unnecessary. Now a total of fifteen years will have elapsed without
the estate being touched, all to the detriment of the beneficiaries. In
balancing the equities between the testator-freezee and the beneficiaries
of his estate our fundamental aim is to allow the freezee to remain in the
picture for a reasonable length of time. At the same time we must not
cause undue hardship to fall upon the beneficiaries as a result of the de-
lay. The solution lies in defining what such a reasonable time is. To be
sure this is a difficult task. It would seem impossible to say in all cases
at what point a person returning to society can "pick up where he left
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off." How, then, should this determination be made, whether for probate
cases or for cases involving a statute of limitations?
In all cases the determination of the length of the period during
which a freezee could successfully resume his former identity should be
made by a panel of judges, not by a jury. A jury should not be used
until the cryonic program is more firmly established. Until the program
generates at least a semblance of public acceptance we should leave this
determination in the hands of those who can best appreciate the impact
that cryonics will have on the present law. The judges would be free to
consult with any witnesses whom they might consider helpful. All rele-
vant facts would have to be considered, and, of course, each case would
be determined on its own merits. However, because of its obvious in-
definiteness the determination could, at best, be given the weight of a
rebuttable presumption, open to attack by either side in the controversy.
For example, should the panel decide that a freezee could re-enter so-
ciety at the very same point he left it any time within thirty months from
the date of death, countervailing considerations could be shown to exist
by either party, so that this time limit might be either shortened or
lengthened. The defendant in a civil suit or the beneficiaries in a probate
proceeding may claim immediate and irreparable harm to their interests
if the judges' initial estimate is upheld. This same argument might be
presented on behalf of the frozen plaintiff or frozen testator. Further
refinements in the law could be made in a probate case where some
necessity is shown to require the expedition of the distribution of the
estate. Thus, after the panel has made its estimate, a certain fraction of
that estimate would be computed. The size of this fraction would depend
upon the necessity of expediting the proceeding. The resulting figure
would be called the "C.R.P." or Critical Resuscitation Period. If the
testator is not revived nor definitely scheduled to be revived during that
period probate should be irrevocably commenced. So if the estimated
period within which the testator could resume his former place in society
is five years and the fraction decided upon is three-fifths or 60%, the
C.R.P. would be three years. Furthermore, the remaining two years
would be called the "c.r.p." or conditional reserve period. A reserve for
the benefit of the testator should be created out of the estate should he
be revived after the expiration of the C.R.P. but before the expiration
of the c.r.p. If he is not revived before the c.r.p. has expired this reserve
would be distributed to those who lost out by the creation of the reserve
in the first instance. The net result of these suggested rules is that if
a beneficiary can show some valid reason for shortening the delay of
probate between the date of death and the date after which the testator
must be erased from the picture, he can succeed in doing so. But he
would not be able to tip the balance so far as to deny the testator a rea-
sonable time within which he can prevent probate or at least a chance
May, 1969
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to share in his own estate. To obviate the possibility that a testator may
be revived without a penny to his name the freezee would be allowed
in all cases to take a portion of his estate with him into his cryocapsule.
In contrast to this writer's suggestions the Cryonics Society of New York
with the assistance of a committee of attorneys has drawn up a trust
agreement which would provide good financial security for a revived
freezee. This trust agreement will be explored in detail later, and it will
be seen at that time that financial security is not the only purpose of the
agreement.
42
It appears that no more damage would be done to the beneficiaries
in a probate case by delaying probate until that time when the testator-
freezee can be said to be "completely dead" as far as his original identity
is concerned than would be done to a defendant in a civil suit by allow-
ing a revived freezee or his representative to bring an action within a
period of time which in no event would exceed the applicable statute of
limitations.
We have seen how death may be reassessed in cases where the pos-
sibility of a freezee's returning to life is the basic issue. Now let us turn
to some of the areas of law which cryonics will affect, but where the time
of the freezee's revival is, for the most part, immaterial. It is first neces-
sary to recognize the puzzling legal questions that are implicit in radical
technological achievements of this sort before we try to answer them.
Our purpose here is to expose these problems and to suggest ways in
which a fluid system of jurisprudence such as ours should cope with
them. It is not our purpose here to speculate on every conceivable prob-
lem that may arise. The law will have to work them out as they appear.
The Right to be Frozen. Mr. Ettinger maintains that:
As to one's basic right to cryonic suspension, there can scarcely be
any question. Within the framework of our traditional and decent
society, the right to live is absolute and does not depend on such
things as one's usefulness; we petition no court for our right to
exist .43
The following statute is clearly applicable here:
A person who is eighteen years of age or older has the right to direct
the manner in which his body shall be disposed of after his death.
44
However, this right of directing the disposition of one's body after death
is conditional: (1) the instructions of the decedent regarding disposition
42 See note 51 infra.
43 Henderson and Ettinger, supra note 32, at 417.
44 N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 4201 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
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must meet certain formal requirements, 4 5 and (2) the recipients of the
body must meet certain standards.", To comply with the first condition
the Cryonics Society of New York has already drawn up a body author-
ization form.47 To buttress this form it has prepared a personal affidavit
form to be completed by the proposed freezee4 s and a consent form to be
completed by the next of kin.4 9 Compliance with the second condition
45 Ibid. § 4201(3) provides that:
Any such donation, authorization or consent made pursuant to the provisions
of this section shall be by written authorization of the deceased made during hislifetime and signed by him in the presence of at least two witnesses, aged eight-
een or over, whose signatures shall be affixed thereto. . . . Neither the appoint-
ment of an administrator or of an executor, if the authorization is contained in
a will, nor a court order shall be necessary or required for such donation, au-thorization or consent, provided that the instrument conveys the clear intention
of the person making the same. Any such disposition of his own body or parts
thereof may be revoked by the donor at any time prior to his death by a writ-ten instrument executed in the same manner as herein provided for authori-
zation.
46 These standards are set out in the N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 4201(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1967):
A donee may be an individual, or a licensed hospital, institution or agency
engaged in the advancement of medical science or the restoration of diseased,
wornout or injured parts of living human beings, or a bank maintained for the
storage, preservation and use of parts of the body. (Emphasis added)
47 In the instrument the proposed freezee states that:[He, she] is --- years of age, of sound mind and will, and it is [his, her]
wish that upon [his, her] death [his, her] remains be preserved cryogenically.
In addition there is a clause providing for delivery of the remains of the deceased
to the named donee as soon as possible after death; a clause providing that the dona-
tion is solely for the purposes of cryogenic preservation; and a clause giving thisinstrument the "same force and effect as a codicil" to a will. The sample form re-ferred to herein as well as those referred to in notes 48, 49 and 51 infra were sent to
this writer by Saul Kent, Editor of Cryonics Reports and Secretary of the Cryonics
Society of New York.
48 This affidavit states essentially what the body authorization form did [see note 47
supra] but adds a disclaimer clause whereby the deponent (freezee) holds the donee
of his body (including its members and employees), and anyone with whom thedonee might contract to help carry out the freezing process, free from all liability
Moreover, the deponent agrees never to bring an action for:
personal or bodily injuries, known or unknown, damages, costs, loss of services,
expenses, and/or compensation on account of, or in any way growing out of or
resulting from, the entire procedure of preparing and cryonically suspending
deponent's body, cadaver, or corpse. This immunity from liability is intended by
the deponent to extend to the persons and circumstances of his possible restora-
tion to life and health.
49 This form calls for the next of kin to state, under oath, that he knows of the de-
sire of the deceased to be frozen and that he will irrevocably grant his rights in thebody of the deceased to whomever the deceased named in the trust agreement [see
note 51 infra]. In In re Bower, 17 Misc. 2d 936, 187 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1959) theCourt held that the surviving spouse or next of kin has a right to possession of thebody in the absence of testamentary direction. By virtue of Section 4201 (1) of theNew York Public Health Law [cited in note 45 supra] a written authorization will
suffice if the formalities specified therein are complied with. Should the freezee's
will or written authorization be lost or concealed by the next of kin, this consent
form would be required before the body could be placed in cryonic suspension.
A disclaimer of liability clause is included and so is a clause providing that:
(Continued on next page)
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is evidenced by the very principles for which the cryonics societies stand.
Certainly they are proper donees.50 Another form in which the proposed
freezee manifests his intention to be cryonically suspended is the inter
vivos trust agreement. This is used primarily, however, to provide for
the payment of the initial and yearly maintenance costs of the cryocap-
sule, and for the care of the freezee; in addition the freezee is insured
a strong financial position on revival. 51 The reasons why the trust is
inter vivos are: (1) to transfer the required funds from the freezee's
assets before his death, and (2) to settle at least the bulk of the legal
and administrative problems "before the patient loses control." 52
Although cryonic suspension can conveniently be fit into the present
laws governing the disposition of dead bodies, many people will make the
argument that freezing violates society's notions of common decency.
But they will meet substantial opposition in the form of established legal
doctrines. It has been said that:
[O]nce it has been admitted that a certain person has the right of
burial, it seems that that person can bury the corpse in any manner
he sees fit, so long as it does not outrage public decency or amount
to a public nuisance.
53
In Seaton v. Commonwealth54 a father was said to violate no duty to the
state by burying his child's body in a paper box in his wood 13t rather
(Continued from preceding page)
The deponent [here, the next of kin] hereby disclaims and renounces any
interests [he, she] may have in any and all monies or property which [the de-
ceased] may designate or has designated to be applied to the expenses of his
cryogenic preservation and suspension.
A question arises as to whether this renunciation will apply to the entire trust fund
or just that amount that will cover the freezee's expenses for a certain length of
time.
50 See note 46, supra.
51 The proposed freezee is referred to as the Grantor. He declares the purpose and
essence of the trust agreement to be the cryonic suspension of his body and his even-
tual restoration. In addition to a delivery of possession clause and a disclaimer of
liability clause (virtually duplicating these provisions in the body authorization and
personal affidavit forms, see notes 47 and 48 supra) the trustee is empowered to use
the trust funds in almost any fashion to further the purpose of the agreement. When
the trust terminates because of the Rule Against Perpetuities (that is, if the freezee
has not been revived by this time) the trustee must contract with some corporation,
individual or institution that it deems competent to carry on the cryonic suspension.
The Grantor is to receive any surplus of trust property, after payment of all ex-
penses and fees, should he be revived and such a surplus exists. If a surplus exists
after the freezee's body is destroyed "by accident, war or other catastrophe" it re-
verts to his estate. Whether negligence in thawing will constitute such a "catas-
trophe" remains to be seen.
If the corpus of the trust is to include only the proceeds of a life insurance
policy there is no reason not to apply the C.R.P./c.r.p. rules described in the text
above, just before footnote 42. See note 57 infra.
52 Henderson and Ettinger, supra note 32, at 416.
53 Note and Comment, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 274, 275 (1924-25).
54 149 Ky. 498, 149 S.W. 871 (1912).
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than in a private cemetery or private burying ground. We also must take
into consideration community interests such as property values and
health hazards"5 in deciding whether mass freezer facilities, or cryo-
toriums, are to be banned. Opponents of cryonics were probably shocked
by a formal opinion (the first of its kind) issued by the Attorney General
of Wisconsin:
[I]t is my opinion that no Wisconsin statute, expressly or by impli-
cation prohibits such interment.56
Life Insurance: The determination of the status of life insurance
proceeds from a policy on the freezee's life is sure to present difficulty.
Will the freezee be dead enough so that the insurance company will have
to pay off the beneficiary? This problem has two distinct facets: (1)
where the beneficiary is the corporation or individual named as trusteein the trust agreement to apply the proceeds of the policy to the cryonic
preservation of the decedent's body,5 7 and (2) where the beneficiary is
the next of kin and where the funds for freezing are to come from other
sources. Mr. Ettinger suggests a solution in the case where the proceeds
of the policy are earmarked for cryonic suspension:
Why shouldn't life insurance companies pay off on policies intendedfor cryonic suspension. The actuarial tables are unaffected, andindeed the insurance companies stand to profit greatly since thefamily needs extra life insurance if they intend to use this type of
financing. 58
Although he insists that "there is an immense new market for life insur-
ance," 59 thus far the companies have flatly refused to write policies in
which a cryonics society is the named beneficiary.60 He further suggests
that if a person is frozen but for some reason didn't have an opportunity
to purchase freezer life insurance, his family should be allowed some sort
of tax relief or subsidy.61 This assumes the fact that freezer coverage
will become very common, and possibly, at some point in a person's life,
mandatory. In the case where the beneficiary is not the named trustee,
Mr. Ettinger feels that, on one condition, the insurance companies should
55 Ettinger, supra note 2, at 92.
56 Written opinion from Bronson C. La Follette to Dr. E. H. Jorris, Wisconsin State
Health Officer, Nov. 1, 1967.
57 The trust agreement provides in note 1 that:
If a life insurance policy is used [as the corpus of the trust], the Trustee(s)named in this instrument should also be named as beneficiary (ies) of the policy.
58 Henderson and Ettinger, supra note 32, at 417.
59 Ettinger, supra note 4, at 67.
60 In a recent telephone conversation this writer was informed by Mrs. RobertEttinger (a member of the Cryonics Society of Michigan) that Fred K. Martin, Jr.of the Travelers Insurance Companies in Fresno, Calif. has written life insurancepolicies with the Cryonics Society of Calif. as beneficiary.
61 Ettinger, supra note 4, at 73.
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pay off. He reasons that as the freezee died under ordinary circum-
stances, the actual basis of his insurance doesn't change. Thus the insur-
ance companies will not suffer any unusual loss. 62 The one condition is
that the freezee shall not have committed suicide with the intent to be
frozen. It seems that many people might elect to leave this world and all
its problems so that they may return to a better society in the future.
This increase in the suicide rate would have to be obviated.
63
Changing a Freezee's Will: We have seen that while a person is in
cryonic suspension his estate should not be touched until we are sure
that if and when he is revived he will be "someone else." But during the
period when the estate is out of reach of the freezee's beneficiaries cer-
tain changes may occur, either in the status of a beneficiary or in the size
of the estate, which the freezee would have compensated for had he still
been living. The issue then arises as to whether a freezee will be allowed
to modify or revoke his will through an agent, i.e., by a power of attor-
ney. Developing the problem logically we see that we are confronted by
a statute which says that to revoke or alter a will you need either an-
other will 64 or:
A writing of the testator clearly indicating an intention to effect
revocation or alteration, executed with the formalities prescribed by
this article for the execution and attestation of a will.
65
These formalities are stated as follows:
[The will] shall be signed . . . by the testator or, in the name of the
testator, by another person in his presence and by his direction.
66
Even if we can possibly extend "in his presence" to a situation where the
"other person" is in the same room as the frozen testator, can we satisfy
the requirement of "by his direction" by validating a pre-death power of
attorney from the freezee to his agent? Here is where the problem lies.
In Weber v. Bridgman'7 the Court held that when the principal dies the
agency relationship is terminated. But now, by statute, if the person
giving the power of attorney is engaged in certain occupations (either
at the time of execution of the power or thereafter) the agency will not
be terminated on the death of the principal. 68 There is no reason why
62 Id. at 94.
63 Id.
64 N.Y. EPTL § 3-4.1 (a) (1) (A) (McKinney 1967).
65 Ibid. § 3-4.1 (a) (1) (B).
66 Id. § 3-2.1(a) (1) (Emphasis added).
67 113 N.Y. 600, 21 N.E. 985 (1889).
68 N.Y. Gen. Ob. Law § 3-501 (1) (McKinney 1964). The occupations are:
a. a person serving in the armed forces of the United States, or
b. a person serving as a merchant seaman outside the continental limits of
the United States; or (Continued on next page)
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an additional category cannot be set up for freezees so as to allow thepower of attorney to revoke or alter a will to survive the cryonic
suspension.
Murder: The theory behind cryonics is that at death the person isnot "completely dead" since most of his cells are still living.69 "Since thecurrent program must conform to the current law," T0 we must use ourpresent criteria to determine when death has occurred in the first in-stance even though these criteria will be changed in the future. Oncea physician cannot reverse the failure of certain essential bodily func-tions the patient is dead as far as we can determine. Therefore, since"freezing kills" 71 by our standards, freezing a person before he dies ismurder. The question is will the law become more tolerant and permiteuthanasia where freezing would be available? Cryonists have asked:Should a terminal cancer patient be frozen by imperfect (legallylethal) methods before clinical death, if this will improve hischances? We must balance the certainty of impending death fromcancer, and the amount of time judged to remain, against the otherfactors. In the near future, some physician may courageously de-cide, with the concurrence of the patient and family, that the ethicalthing is to freeze the patient before clinical death, and then the cus-tom may grow, perhaps, without ever being brought to litigation."2
Other Areas of Law: Some of the other problems that the law will
soon face are:
(1) whether damages can be suffered by a freezee (in tort, contract,
etc.)
(2) assuming a freezee can suffer damages, whether malpracticesuits against physicians and technicians who freeze, maintain and thawthe patient will be successful. The effectiveness of disclaimer clauses inlegal agreements will have to be tested.73(3) whether actions against manufacturers and distributors of thefreezing apparatus will be successful (product liability).
Keeping the law up to date, that is, molding it to fit new techno-logical developments such as cryogenic freezing of human bodies is an
(Continued from preceding page)c. a person outside such continental limits by permission, assignment ordirection of any department or official of the United States government in con-nection with the prosecution of any war or any campaign of a military naturein which the armed forces of the United States are participating or have beenordered to participate.
69 Henderson and Ettinger, supra note 32, at 415.
70 Id.
71 Quoted in Frisch, supra note 7, at 20.
72 Henderson and Ettinger, supra note 32, at 417.
73 See notes 46-48 supra.
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extremely difficult undertaking. The intellectual problem of interpreting
a standard word such as "death" in new (and certainly unusual) situa-
tions is compounded by the vast number of these situations that will in-
evitably confront us. Every single statute that contains the word "death"
or the word "decedent" will have to be re-examined. Every common law
concept that incorporates these and related words will also have to be
re-examined.
We have seen why the concept of death must be reassessed in the
light of the recognition of cryonic suspension as a reality. But we must
keep in mind that reassessment is not redefinition. 74 For the time being
we must restrict our refusal to consider death as a finality to the field of
cryonics. Making legal provisions for future scientific discoveries is an
impossibility. Therefore, we are totally unprepared to make death com-
pletely elastic. Until science is able to prevent death (i.e., before it
occurs) as opposed to "curing" it (i.e., after it occurs), we must defer to
its "attempt" at finality.
It is true that a great demand is being made on future scientists. As
Dr. Arthur P. Rinfret, a cryobiologist, has said:
[Y]ou really cannot argue the success or failure of the experiment
[cryonic suspension] on scientific grounds. It is merely a statement
of faith-faith in the capabilities of the science of the future, and
faith that future scientists will be interested in trying to revive the
body.
75
They will be required not only to cure the cause of death but also to re-
vive the body, either before or after curing the cause of death. But there
is no reason to doubt that science can discover a way whereby such a
procedure would become routine. As a result, the possibility of revival
after only a few years, or even a few months is not as remote as some
might be inclined to think. And ten years from now will bring with it
an even greater prospect of early revival. That is, should terminal cancer
still be a bane to mankind in the year 1979, the chances that a cure will
be discovered within a very short time thereafter will definitely be great-
er than they are today. It is clear that whether we are confronted with
the legal implications of cryonics next year or ten years from now, we
have to be prepared.
74 Regarding organ transplantation it has been said that:
'[R]edefining' death in this context must be recognized as a euphemism for
advancing the legal moment of death to a point in time when the removal of
organs would leave them in perfectly useful form. To put it crudely, redefining
death for purposes of recovery of an organ, the donor should be dead, but not
quite dead.
Grad, Legislative Responses to the New Biology: Limits and Possibilities, 15
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 480, 500 (1968). Frank P. Grad is an Adjunct Professor of Legisla-
tion at Columbia Law School.
75 Quoted in Cryoburial Raises Scientific Heat, supra note 31, at 35. Arthur P. Rin-
fret is a cryobiologist with the Linde Division of Union Carbide Corp. in Tonawanda,
N.Y.
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